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The Challenge of Western Neutralism 




On 22 January 1962, the British and Nigerian Governments announced that they had agreed 
to abrogate the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement,1 which had only been signed a year 
earlier upon Nigeria’s independence.2 This dramatic move was supposed to protect and 
strengthen the pro-British government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa which, because of its 
pro-western stance in general, and the defense agreement with Britain in particular, had been 
faced with increasingly strong opposition in parliament and the streets, as well as criticism 
from other African states.3 The abrogation was welcomed by the domestic opposition, which 
was dominated by the Action Group, the Nigerian Youth Congress, and the National Union 
of Nigerian Students. It was not only considered “a blow against neo-colonialism,” but the 
opposition also rejoiced that the major obstacle to “the declared policy of the Federal 
Government of ‘non-alignment’ in foreign matters” had been removed.4 According to the 
West German Ambassador in Lagos, Harald Count von Posadowsky-Wehner, it was 
instructive that the defense agreement was seen as a neo-colonial scheme that conflicted with 
the principle of non-alignment. In his view, “with this agreement immediately after 
independence,” Britain had “demonstrated little psychological empathy.”5 
Only one-and-a-half years after this watershed in Anglo-Nigerian relations, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became responsible for the build-up of the Nigerian Air 
Force. This was, as it will be argued here, rendered possible by the interrelated factors of 
Britain’s diminishing influence on Nigerian defense in the wake of the abrogation of the 
defense agreement, and Nigeria’s increasingly strong neutralism, which led Lagos to search 
for alternative sources of military assistance. In light of the inability of Commonwealth 
                                                          
1 “Defence Pact Abrogated,” West African Pilot, 22 January 1962, Vol. XXV, No. 7,402, p. 1, National 
Archives of Nigeria Ibadan, University of Ibadan (hereafter NANI), Newspapers. 
2 Defence Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Federation of Nigeria, 5 January 1961, The National Archives, Kew, United 
Kingdom (hereafter TNA), DO 118/218. 
3 “Defence Pact Scrapped,” Nigerian Morning Post, Vol. 1, No. 96, 22 January 1962, p. 1, NANI, Newspapers. 
On this aspect of and the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement more generally see: Marco Wyss, “A Post-
Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, 1958-1962,” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2016), pp. 976-1000. 
4 “Defence Pact Reactions,” West African Pilot, 23 January 1962, Vol. XXV, No. 7,403, p. 8, NANI, 
Newspapers. 
5 Anglo-nigerianisches Verteidigungsabkommen, Posadowsky-Wehner (German Embassy Lagos), 23 January 
1962, Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin (hereafter PA AA), B14, 81.04, 737. 
2 
 
countries other than Britain to fully compensate for British military know-how and hardware, 
the western outlook of the Nigerian Government, as well as Germany’s military reputation 
and distant colonial past, by mid-1963, the FRG had thus become responsible for Nigeria’s 
third armed service. This was a setback for London, for whom it had been self-evident that if 
the Nigerians would opt for the establishment of an air force, they would turn to their ‘mother 
country’ and the Royal Air Force (RAF). This potentiality was clearly stated in the Anglo-
Nigerian Defense Agreement and, once the latter had been rescinded, Whitehall counted on 
its military assistance to maintain its security role and interests in Nigeria. Moreover, despite 
the ‘failure’ of the formal defense relationship, the British and Nigerian Governments 
promised each other to remain faithful to the spirit and main clauses of the defense agreement 
by exchange of letters.6 This transpired in the press release on the abrogation, which stated 
that “Each Government will, however, endeavour to afford the other at all times such 
assistance and facilities in defence matters as are appropriate between partners in the 
Commonwealth.”7 The opposition, notably the Action Group leader Obafemi Awolowo, was 
thus quick to exclaim that the “military alliance with Britain is not yet completely broken,” 
and “its spirit remains and lives on.”8 
In this climate, and with non-alignment on the rise in the Third World,9 Lagos wanted 
to demonstrate that it was living up to its proclaimed foreign policy of non-alignment by 
reducing its defense ties with London. In Nigeria, however, the British were challenged by a 
variant of neutralism that was – at least at the governmental level – anti-communist and pro-
western, and inasmuch marked by anti-colonial and African solidarity sentiments as by the 
Cold War struggle. This helps to explain why Lagos turned to another western country, which 
was neither a colonial nor a superpower, rather than the Soviet Union or another Eastern Bloc 
country, as an alternative for British military assistance. The possibility that newly 
independent African countries like Nigeria might turn to the Soviet Bloc for weapons and 
military training hung like a Damoclean sword over the head of British policymakers. In the 
wake of decolonization, the Cold War had also definitely arrived in Africa.10 Soviet leader 
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Nikita Khrushchev’s calls for an offensive in the Third World were followed by deeds. With 
the first African countries gaining independence in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union tried to 
establish a foothold on the continent. Thereby, Moscow benefitted from Paris cutting off 
relations with Conakry after the Guineans had rejected General Charles de Gaulle’s Franco-
African Community; Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s anti-colonial and at times anti-
western Pan-Africanist agenda; and Congolese President Patrice Lumumba’s disillusionment 
with the United Nations and the western powers, especially the United States. As a result, by 
the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviets had made important inroads into West Africa, notably 
in Guinea, Ghana, the Congo and, after the break-up of the Mali Federation (Senegal and the 
Sudanese Republic), Mali.11 This inevitably led to a heavier involvement of the United States, 
which responded with extensive development aid, force – notably in the Congo – and even a 
charm offensive by President John F. Kennedy to forestall and roll back Soviet advances on 
the African continent.12 
Yet the United States and the former colonial powers did not only face the Soviets in 
Africa. In addition to the increasing Chinese involvement following the Sino-Soviet split,13 
the Soviet Union was from the beginning supported by some of its satellites, especially 
Czechoslovakia. Loyal to Moscow and in pursuit of economic opportunities, international 
legitimacy, and communist ideals, Prague became heavily involved in Africa. Drawing on 
their technical skills and historical experience of Africa, the Czechoslovaks became important 
partners for a number of African states, especially the so-called ‘radical’ ones. More 
specifically, starting in the late 1950s and thanks to its important armaments industry, 
Czechoslovakia turned into a significant source of military assistance for Guinea, Mali, and 
Ghana, notably also in the field of military aviation.14 Less suspicious than the Soviet Union, 
towards the mid-1960s, the small state of Czechoslovakia also began to establish military 
relationships with ‘conservative’ African states, notably with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Morocco. Interestingly, this never was an option for the leaders of the First Nigerian 
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Republic, which had established diplomatic relations with Prague in 1961.15 Instead, and 
because of their western orientation, they preferred to search for alternative sources of 
military assistance within the Commonwealth and the Western Bloc.  
The general tenor among historians and analysts of Nigerian foreign policy is that the 
Government of the First Republic, which lasted from independence in October 1960 to the 
military coup d’état in January 1966, was clearly pro-western and anti-Soviet, or even a neo-
colonial stooge.16 Yet there have also been more nuanced or even dissonant voices, such as 
Gordon J. Idang and Olasupo A. Ojedokun, who have argued that there were indeed 
substantial neutralist and Pan-Africanist elements in Nigeria’s early foreign policy, which 
grew stronger in reaction to domestic opposition and, especially, after the abrogation of the 
defense agreement.17 Douglas G. Anglin and Olatunde John Ojo have gone even a step 
further by arguing in their respective works that Nigeria was indeed independent and non-
aligned, despite being economically dependent on the West. Among other things, this was, in 
their view, illustrated by Nigeria’s leading position in the campaign against South Africa in 
both the Commonwealth and the United Nations, the breaking of diplomatic relations with 
Paris following the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, as well as the rejection of aid from the 
European Economic Community and, occasionally, from Britain.18 
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These conflicting perspectives on the foreign policy record of the Balewa regime are 
not mutually exclusive, but can be reconciled, notably through the concept of western 
neutralism or non-alignment. This becomes more evident in comparing neutralism to 
neutrality. The traditional western neutrals Sweden and Switzerland were both clearly anti-
communist and western-oriented, and even secretly co-operated with leading NATO powers, 
first Britain, and then the United States. Nevertheless, their neutrality came to be accepted, 
and was at times even praised, by the major Cold War powers.19 In contrast to European 
neutrality, which – with the notable exception of Finland – was clearly western-biased, Third 
World neutralism or non-alignment has generally been considered eastern-oriented or anti-
western. Therefore, it was at first seen as a threat by the United States, and as an opportunity 
by the Soviet Union.20 In line with this view, the scholarly literature on neutralism and non-
alignment has predominantly focused on the so-called ‘radical’ states, notably on Ghana in 
Africa, whereas Nigeria has been considered a ‘moderate’, and thus not necessarily a 
neutralist state.21 London was at first concerned, but then came to accept and see a positive 
potential in the phenomenon of neutralism in the Global Cold War.22 Yet Whitehall focused 
on the so-called ‘radical’ states, while the Nigerian Government was, despite its early 
neutralist rhetoric, considered pro-British and largely aligned with the west. The rise of 
Nigeria’s western, yet increasingly anti-British neutralism thus posed a challenge for Britain. 
Meanwhile, it provided the FRG with the opportunity to gain the friendship of the most 
populous independent African state. Thereby, the West Germans could strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in their own parallel Cold War.23 
                                                          
19 See, for instance, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Non-aligned to what? European neutrality and the Cold War,” in 
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20 Marco Wyss et al., “Introduction: A tightrope walk – neutrality and neutralism in the global Cold War,” in 
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21 See, for instance, Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovska, eds., The Non-Aligned 
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Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015); H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of 
the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and 
the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
22 Ann Lane, “Third World Neutralism and British Cold War Strategy, 1960-62,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 
14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 151-174. 
23 On the German-German Cold War see William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to 
Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Ulf Engel 
and Hans-Georg Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 
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Consequently, this article allows us to study the hitherto largely neglected western 
variant of neutralism and non-alignment, and thereby shed light on Britain’s postcolonial 
security role in West Africa. The British were challenged by an increasingly assertive and 
neutralist Nigerian leadership, and in contrast to traditional Cold War patterns, the 
competition came from within, and not outside the Western Bloc. This is well illustrated by 
the episode of the build-up of the Nigerian Air Force, which will be analyzed – on the basis 
of research in British, German, Nigerian, and American archives – in three parts: firstly, the 
‘paternal’ British advisory role from late decolonization to the early days of independence; 
secondly, the Nigerian search for alternative sources of military assistance in Commonwealth 
and neutral countries in the run up to and in the months after the abrogation of the Anglo-
Nigerian Defense Agreement; and, thirdly, the German breakthrough on the Nigerian defense 
market by gaining the responsibility for the creation of a Nigerian Air Force. Thereby, this 
article not only uncovers the forgotten western variant of neutralism and its similarities with 
European Cold War neutrality, but also shows the room for maneuver and opportunities that 
existed for newly independent African states and allies of the former colonial powers and the 
United States in the East-West struggle. Ultimately, and to a certain extent mirroring the 
recent work of Philip E. Muehlenbeck on Czechoslovakia and the Eastern Bloc in Africa,24 
this article illustrates the rivalry and cooperation that existed within the Western Bloc, the 
early African Cold War market for military assistance, and the complexity of the East-West 
struggle in Africa. There, the leaders of the newly independent states were under pressure 
from within and other African states, and the choice of the provider(s) of military assistance 
could determine their credibility and that of their policies. 
 
A British Prerogative 
In the run up to and the early days of independence, London saw the potential build-up of a 
Nigerian Air Force as its prerogative. The two existing armed services, the army and the 
navy, had not only been established by Britain, but they also remained heavily reliant on 
British officers and equipment.25 Moreover, the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement clearly 
stated that Britain would assist Nigeria with the establishment of an air force. This was part 
of the military assistance that London had been willing to offer in exchange to secure its 
strategic interests in Nigeria, first and foremost overflying and staging rights. Meanwhile, the 
                                                          
24 Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia. 
25 On the origins and history of the Nigerian Armed Forces during the First Republic, see Jimi Peters, The 
Nigerian Military and the State (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), chs. 3 and 4. 
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Nigerian Government seemed determined to retain close and intimate ties with Britain, and 
the references of Nigerian leaders to non-alignment and neutralism were dismissed as 
harmless by Whitehall. 
In the late 1950s, the British shared the American fear that the Soviet Union could use 
and encourage neutralism in Africa as a means to wean away the newly independent 
countries from the West.26 This fear did not, however, apply to Nigeria. The future Nigerian 
leaders and their parties were pro-Western, and in agreement to retain a close relationship 
with Britain after independence.27 Moreover, their references to non-alignment were either 
lukewarm, or not translated into practice. The Action Group, which dominated the Western 
Region, advocated for instance in its 1958 foreign policy paper “a policy of close friendship 
towards Great Britain.” Meanwhile, the issue of non-alignment, and whether it was to “be 
preferred to the policy of actively associating with one of the blocs,” had yet to be 
examined.28 In early 1959, policymakers in Whitehall acknowledged that external contacts 
after independence “might encourage a movement towards political neutralism.” But since 
“neutralist policies were not at present in favour in Nigeria,” and there was “a strong pro-
Commonwealth and anti-Communist feeling” in Nigeria, they believed that this was 
unlikely.29 In their view, it was only the leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC), which predominantly represented the Eastern Region, who “perhaps in 
his hearts of hearts […] advocates a purely ‘neutralist’ policy.”30 Yet when Nnamdi Azikiwe 
came out in autumn 1959 with a statement in favor of neutralism, this was dismissed as an 
attempt by the NCNC to distinguish itself from the Action Group. The British Deputy 
Governor-General and the Nigerian Prime Minister even laughed together about it, and 
remembered Azikiwe’s strong support to the defense agreement during the initial discussions 
in 1958.31 Balewa, whose emerging administration happily received substantial foreign policy 
advice from the British – also on the issue of neutralism – was confident that there was “no 
                                                          
26 “[Assessment, agreed with Mr Dulles, of communist interference in tropical Africa]: circular tel (no 67) from 
Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) to British representatives in Africa,” British Documents on the End of Empire (BDEE), 
Series A, Vol. 4, Part II, p. 231. 
27 Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy, pp. 27-29. 
28 Fingland (Lagos) to Emanuel (Colonial Office, CO), 15 September 1958, TNA, DO 35/10474. 
29 “AF (59) 2, [British influence after independence]: Cabinet (Official) Africa Committee minutes,” 22 January 
1959, BDEE, Series B, Vol. 7, Part II, pp. 586-587. 
30 “AF (59) 5, ‘Prospects for the African territories for which the Colonial Office is responsible’: CO 
memorandum for the Cabinet (official) Africa Committee,” 20 February 1959, BDEE, Series B, Vol. 7, Part II, 
p. 593. 
31 Grey (Lagos) to Eastwood (CO), 16 September 1959, TNA, CO/554/2059. 
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real risk of Nigeria becoming neutralist” if the West provided development aid.32 The Prime 
Minister’s own party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which was Britain’s favorite 
political partner in Nigeria, “rule[d] out completely any idea of adopting a policy of neutrality 
in international affairs.” In its foreign policy statement of October 1959, the NPC instead 
emphasized that “Nigeria must maintain the closest relationship with the United Kingdom.”33 
On the eve of independence, however, the tone began to change. In his first official 
foreign policy statement to the Nigerian House of Representatives on 20 August 1960, 
Balewa observed that it was “wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter 
of routine with any of the power blocs.”34 The British were neither surprised, nor alarmed by 
this apparent shift towards non-alignment. Not only had they been able to read and 
moderately intervene on a draft of the speech, but they were also aware that Balewa was 
catering to the neutralist wing of his and the NPC’s coalition partner, the NCNC. The 
statement was thus seen as a “holding operation,” and not “as presaging any drastic 
reorientation of Nigeria’s long standing friendship and regard for the West.”35 The ambiguity 
of Nigeria’s officially declared non-alignment also transpired in Balewa’s speech to the 
United Nations General Assembly in October, immediately after independence. While he 
reiterated Nigeria’s non-alignment, he also declared “we shall not forget our old friends.”36 
This was certainly reassuring for officials in Whitehall, because while they had come to see 
the potential benefits of “genuine” neutralism in Africa, Nigeria was supposed to be built up 
as a pro-Western country.37 
The provision of military assistance was not only seen as a quid pro quo for securing 
British strategic interests, but also a means to maintain influence over the Nigerian Armed 
Forces and thereby help retain Nigeria close to Britain and the West. Although the British 
saw other priorities for the Nigerian Armed Forces, they thus responded favorably to the 
desire of Nigerian politicians to have an air force. In early 1958, when the Nigerian House of 
                                                          
32 “[Nigerian foreign policy]: letter (reply from C G Eastwood to A W Snelling outlining the CO response to M 
E Allen’s memorandum on Nigerian foreign policy. Enclosure: CO proposed additions to memorandum,” 21 
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in Nigeria,” 1 July 1959, BDEE, Series B, Vol. 7, Part II, pp. 602-603; p. 607.  
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34 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, “A Policy for Foreign Affairs,” 20 August 1960, in Idem, Nigeria Speaks: 
Speeches Made between 1957 and 1964, Selected and introduced by Sam Epelle (Ikeja: Longmans of Nigeria, 
1964), p. 57. 
35 “[Foreign policy]: letter from S J G Fingland to D W S Hunt on a speck by Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa on Nigeria’s foreign policy alignment,” 24 August 1960, BDEE, Series B, Vol. 7, Part II, pp. 730-731. 
36 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, “Sovereign Nigeria and the World,” 8 October 1960, in Idem, Nigeria Speaks, 
pp. 62-63. 
37 “‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’: officials’ interdepartmental paper (FO, CO, CRO),” 1 August 
1960, BDEE, Series A, Vol. 4, Part I, pp. 189, 191. 
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Representatives discussed the forthcoming takeover of the military forces from the British, 
there were not only calls for continued British military assistance, but one representative also 
called for the establishment of an air force. In his view, which was shared by other 
representatives, an air force was “among those things necessary for an independent 
country.”38 Consequently, when the British tried to win over the Nigerian Prime Minister and 
Regional Premiers for a defense agreement on the margin of the constitutional talks in 
London in October 1958, they also promised to help with the build-up of an air force.39 
The potential air force assistance and Britain’s strategic interests were thus closely 
linked from the beginning. When the Air Secretary inspected the RAF’s staging facilities at 
Kano in April 1959, the Nigerian Minister of Communications and Aviation, Samuel 
Akintola, voiced a strong interest in British air force assistance. George Ward was 
forthcoming and promised information on British assistance to the Indian and Pakistani air 
forces. It was in Britain’s “wider interest,” he observed to the Colonial Secretary, “to 
encourage them to look to us as it should help in many ways not least in the continuance of 
our staging and overflying rights.”40 Alan Lennox-Boyd fully agreed, also because he did not 
want the Nigerians to look elsewhere.41 The Air Secretary thus followed up on his promise to 
the Nigerian Aviation Minister and, in addition, offered to make officers available to give 
more detailed advice.42 But to the Air Ministry’s great disappointment, the Nigerian leaders 
had not yet made up their mind on the question of an air force and, apparently also under 
pressure from the opposition, whistled back their Aviation Minister. The Colonial Office thus 
advised the Air Ministry not to press the issue.43 The only tangible result of this episode was 
the provision of two RAF surplus aircraft for the setting up of a Nigerian Government Flying 
Training School.44 
The Air Ministry was not, however, willing to give up and lose out on an opportunity 
to gain long-term influence over a Nigerian armed service. In January 1960, in reaction to an 
enquiry by the Prime Minister what additional military assistance Britain could provide to 
                                                          
38 “Governor-General’s Speech,” 19 February 1958, in Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives, 
Debates, Official Report, Vol. I, Session 1958-59, Comprised Period from 18th February-5th March, 1958 
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41 Lennox-Boyd (CO) to Ward (AM), 7 May 1959, TNA, AIR 19/954. 
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43 Cooper to Hudleston (both AM), 15 and 21 September 1959; Hudleston to Cooper (both AM), 16 and 22 
September 1959, TNA, AIR 19/954. 
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allay Nigerian security fears and sweeten the pill of the defense agreement,45 the Vice-Chief 
of the Air Staff asked the Air Secretary to press the case for air force assistance to Nigeria 
with the Defense Minister. “It could be,” argued Edward Hudleston, “a grave embarrassment 
to us if Nigeria were to turn to some other country for ‘air advice’ c.f. Ghana.”46 But for the 
time being, the air force assistance planning did not go beyond the Air Ministry. Moreover, 
Ghana was an unlikely alternative source of assistance. The Nigerian desire to have an air 
force was also motivated by jealousy and fear in reaction to the build-up of a Ghanaian air 
force with Soviet aircraft and RAF training.47 
Immediately after Nigeria’s independence in October 1960, Lagos’ interest in an air 
force became more pronounced and official. In addition, the Air Ministry gained the support 
of the Commonwealth Relations Office, which was now responsible for Britain’s relations 
with Nigeria and willing to ask the High Commission in Lagos “to cast a discreet fly and 
report.”48 The signs from the Nigerian capital were encouraging. On 19 November 1960, in 
presenting and defending the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Agreement to the House of 
Representatives, the Nigerian Defense Minister referred to the article (II) and paragraph in 
which Britain promised to help with the build-up of an air force.49 Muhammadu Ribadu then 
not only emphasized the need to start building up an air force as soon as possible, but also 
argued that “those Members who saw the fine display of flying during the Independence 
Celebrations will think it not wrong of us to consider the Royal Air Force of the United 
Kingdom will provide excellent advanced air training for our airmen.”50 The Commonwealth 
Relations Office thus believed that time was ripe to make a discreet approach to the Nigerians 
on the issue of air force assistance.51 The UK High Commissioner in Lagos, Antony Head, 
even expected an approach by the Nigerians themselves.52 In January 1961, the British 
Military Adviser in Lagos was thus instructed to start discussions on air force assistance with 
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the Nigerian Government. But he was “to avoid the impression that we are trying to foist onto 
the Nigerians something they may not want.”53 
The problem was that while the Nigerians knew that they wanted an air force, they did 
not know what kind of air force this should be.54 During a visit to London in early March 
1961, the Nigerian Defense Minister thus expressed his hope to Commonwealth Secretary 
Duncan Sandys to get an air force adviser from Britain or another Commonwealth country.55 
The Air Ministry was not only willing to provide an adviser, but even recommended the 
sending of an RAF team to Nigeria to advise the Nigerian Government on the form of the 
Nigerian air force. The Nigerians were to be encouraged to look to the RAF for assistance to 
“sustain the Nigerian Defence Agreement,” and avoid that “neutral or possibly unfriendly 
countries […] move in by default.”56 The British Defense Minister followed the Air 
Ministry’s advice during his meeting with the Nigerian Defense Minister in mid-March. 
When Ribadu pointed out that what was needed was a preliminary study by experts, Harold 
Watkinson seized the opportunity to recommend a small RAF mission. This was well 
received by the Nigerian Defense Minister, who promised to get back about this upon his 
return home.57 Ribadu did not, however, follow up on his promise. By mid-May, the Air 
Secretary, Julian Amery, thus asked Head in Lagos “for putting a word in the right quarter” in 
case he “saw a suitable opportunity.”58 This was an urgent matter for the Air Ministry, which 
saw a “tendency for new independent countries to look for assistant elsewhere.”59 
There had, for now, been no sign that Nigeria might turn elsewhere – other than 
Ribadu mentioning Commonwealth countries as an alternative to Britain for air force advice. 
In light of the defense agreement, the seemingly pro-British Nigerian leadership, and the 
substantial practical defense links between Britain and Nigeria, it was self-evident for British 
military planners that the RAF would provide the required air force assistance. But Lagos’ 
non-committal attitude made them increasingly nervous, and wary that they would soon face 
competition on the Nigerian defense market. And soon they did, because the Nigerian attitude 
towards Britain, the world and, as a corollary, neutralism, was changing. 
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A Family Affair 
In the wake of independence, the Nigerian Government was still pro-British and western-
oriented. Simultaneously, however, it was free from Britain’s political tutelage and no longer 
had to please Whitehall in order to ensure a smooth transition to independence. Moreover, it 
was both under domestic and external pressure. At the domestic level, the Action Group, 
which had changed political course following its electoral defeat, as well as the Nigerian 
Youth Movement, the National Union of Nigerian Students, and trade union elements, called 
on the government – often through large-scale and at times violent protests – to live up to its 
proclaimed foreign policy of non-alignment. Externally, this was echoed by the Casablanca 
Group, notably Ghana, which accused Nigeria of not being truly independent. This was all 
the more problematic, because Lagos wished to play a leading role in African and, even, 
world affairs. As a result, Nigeria began to move slowly towards a more nationalistic and 
neutralist position.60 In addition to a less hostile attitude towards the Eastern bloc and the 
abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, this also led to a search for complementary, 
if not alternative sources of military assistance, but at first not necessarily beyond the 
‘family’ of Commonwealth nations. 
The changing mood in Nigeria made itself already felt one month after independence 
during the parliamentary debate on the defense agreement. In reaction to accusations from the 
opposition, the Defense Minister emphasized that it did neither infringe on Nigeria’s 
independence, nor preclude the government from seeking military assistance elsewhere than 
Britain. Meanwhile, the Finance Minister added that the draft agreement had been improved 
“to reflect the sovereignty of Nigeria and her adoption of a foreign policy of non-
alignment.”61 But despite these justifications and the passing of the agreement, opposition to 
it continued unabated. This did not escape the attention of British policymakers. In June 
1961, the High Commission in Lagos thus advised not to press the Nigerian Government with 
the long overdue registration of the defense agreement at the United Nations ahead of the 
Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, because this could “re-open the controversy in this 
Country on the Agreement.”62 Only once Nigeria had received a last minute invitation to 
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Belgrade in July, the Commonwealth Relations Office wished to go ahead with the 
registration.63 But eventually, Balewa decided not to attend the conference. The official 
explanation was that, on the one hand, Nigeria did not believe in blocs and did thus not want 
to join a third bloc in the making and, on the other, an invitation had only reached Lagos late 
because Nigeria’s attendance was disputed among core non-aligned nations.64 Back in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, however, it was assumed that the defense agreement “was 
probably the cause of Nigeria’s absence.”65 In reaction to the lobbying of the British High 
Commission in Lagos, by autumn Whitehall had come to realize that the defense agreement 
was a thorn in Anglo-Nigerian relations, notably because it undermined Nigeria’s non-
aligned credentials.66 Consequently, and despite opposition from the Air Ministry, London 
and Lagos agreed to abrogate the agreement in early 1962.67 But despite this dramatic move, 
the British High Commissioner foresaw that the Balewa regime would remain under pressure 
to live up to its declared non-alignment policy.68 Against this background, Lagos did not want 
to be seen to solely rely on Britain for military assistance. 
Already in late spring 1961, it came to Whitehall’s attention that the Nigerian 
Government was putting its feelers out. The Air Ministry was informed by the British aircraft 
manufacturer Armstrong Siddeley that De Havilland Canada was in discussions for the sale 
of aircraft with Nigeria.69 Moreover, Ribadu had still not followed up on his promise to 
formally request an RAF study mission. But the British High Commissioner reassured the Air 
Secretary that he did not think that “the reason for this dilatory procedure is in any way 
sinister, i.e. I don’t think he is contemplating getting somebody else to do the job.” Head 
believed instead that the Nigerian Government had realized how costly the creation of an air 
force would be, and that the new service risked being dominated by Igbos, who already had a 
lot of officers in the army.70 Simultaneously, however, the UK High Commission informed 
the Commonwealth Relations Office that while the Nigerians would probably turn to Britain 
for their air force, for political reasons they “may insist that another Commonwealth country, 
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non-white, be brought into the scheme.”71 Indeed, in August, the Nigerian Defense Minister 
visited India, apparently to enquire about the possibility of Indian training for Nigerian air 
force personnel.72 
Yet the whole issue of a Nigerian air force remained blurred, and was followed up at 
different levels and into different directions. During the Nigerian Prime Minister’s visit to 
Washington in July 1961, his Foreign Minister enquired about potential US air force 
assistance. But this approach remained without consequences. Not only did the Americans 
still see military assistance to Nigeria as a British prerogative, but, as they informed London, 
they were opposed to “prestige assistance of this kind.”73 Meanwhile, also in July, the 
Nigerian Finance Minister insisted in a meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary on the 
need for a Nigerian air force in light of Ghana’s Soviet-sponsored military build-up and 
potential aggression. Instead of encouraging this view, Duncan Sandys argued that an 
outright attack by Ghana was unlikely, and if there was a danger it was of a subversive 
nature. In order to meet this threat, he recommended an expansion of the army, rather than 
the build-up of a costly air force.74 These ‘sideshows’ reflected the fact while Nigerian 
ministers all seemed to want an air force, they did still not have a commonly agreed plan on 
how to pursue this aim. Moreover, as Sandys’ case illustrates, not all policymakers in 
Whitehall shared the Air Ministry’s enthusiasm for building up an air force in Nigeria. 
But the advocates of British air force assistance, notably the Minister of Defense and 
the Air Secretary, were aware that in order to succeed they had to win over the increasingly 
influential Nigerian Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who was to receive special 
attention during his visits to London.75 In a meeting of 12 September 1961, during which 
Harold Watkinson almost begged Ribadu to accept British military assistance for, among 
other things, the establishment of a military academy and an ordnance factory, the issue of a 
Nigerian air force figured prominently on the agenda. Ribadu stated that while he would 
welcome assistance from Britain, he “hoped to get some assistance elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, perhaps from India and Canada.” In reaction to this, Watkinson did not only 
reiterate his recommendation for a British advisory mission, but also emphasized that he “was 
anxious to be as helpful as was possible,” notably in the provision of training for Nigerian 
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pilots in Britain.76 The next day, the Nigerian Defense Minister met with the Air Secretary. 
While much of the discussion turned around the role of Nigeria’s future air force – mostly 
transport – and the adequate aircraft, Ribadu eventually agreed to the Air Ministry’s repeated 
recommendation for an advisory team being sent to Nigeria.77 
But immediately thereafter, the Nigerian Defense Minister flew to Canada to ask for 
air force assistance. Apparently, he was successful. On 28 September, Ribadu publicly 
announced that the Canadian Government had promised to train Nigerian officer cadets in 
Canada and to send a military team to Nigeria to assess its training requirements, and that he 
would recommend the purchase of Canadian De Havilland aircraft, in particular the Caribou, 
to his government.78 Moreover, the Air Ministry was informed that the Nigerian Minister did 
not anymore wish to see British aircraft or to visit an RAF training establishment after his trip 
to Canada, as it had been agreed earlier. The Air Ministry thus asked Harold Watkinson, who 
was supposed to meet with his Nigerian counterpart, to enquire whether Ribadu still wanted 
an RAF team to visit his country.79 In their meeting of 4 October, the Nigerian Defense 
Minister said that he hoped to have a decision on this matter by the middle of the month.80 
This time, Ribadu stood by his word, and on 14 October, he made a formal request for an 
RAF team to visit Nigeria – alongside another one for a military academy.81 
The British were aware that in addition to Canada and India, Ribadu had also visited 
Ethiopia, Sweden, and Switzerland to discuss, depending on the country’s military and 
defense-industrial base, potential support for an air force, a military academy, an ordnance 
factory, as well as training and equipment more generally.82 The only immediately visible 
result had been the Canadian willingness to help Nigeria not only with an air force, but also a 
military academy. In light of their long-standing and close defense relationship, the British 
began to discuss with the Canadians the coordination of their potential military assistance in 
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these fields to Nigeria, both at ministerial and officials’ levels.83 This coordination and, 
especially, the contribution from other sources than Britain was actually seen as necessary – 
not only from a Nigerian, but also a British perspective. On its return in November 1961, the 
RAF advisory mission to Nigeria on the one hand reported that the Nigerians still preferred 
air force assistance from two to three Commonwealth countries, with Ribadu mentioning 
Canada and India in particular. On the other, it concluded that the build-up of a Nigerian air 
force was such a difficult and extensive task that Britain should not undertake it single-
handedly. Britain should have the primary and overall responsibility, but complementary 
assistance from within the Commonwealth was almost considered essential.84 Meanwhile, the 
Nigerian Defense Minister, who had read the reports, seemed very satisfied,85 and the British 
High Commissioner in Lagos qualified the RAF team’s visit to Nigeria as a success and 
beneficial to Anglo-Nigerian relations.86 In following up on this, the British Defense Minister 
thus optimistically offered his Nigerian counterpart “any further help you want.”87 Indeed, on 
22 December 1961, the Nigerian Government approached London for an offer to build-up a 
Nigerian Air Force. But simultaneously, and as the British were informed, it made similar 
requests to Canada, India and, as a new contender, the neutral, yet western-oriented 
Sweden.88 
The problem was that while Britain was ‘downgraded’ to one among four potential 
contenders for air force assistance to Nigeria, the matter reached an unprecedented degree of 
urgency in light of the increasingly inevitable abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense 
Agreement. In early January 1962, the Commonwealth Secretary expressed to the Chief of 
the Defence Staff the hope that air force assistance to Nigeria would help securing Britain’s 
overflying and staging needs until a new arrangement could be found.89 Consequently, 
Sandys had also now joined the proponents of a British air force mission to Nigeria. 
Meanwhile, the pressure from within the Air Ministry did not only step up a degree, but was 
also reinforced by British aircraft manufacturers who feared losing out against Canadian, 
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Swedish, and even German competitors.90 On 18 January 1962, the Chiefs of Staff thus 
concluded that if “we were quick to respond to their [the Nigerians’] requests it was probable 
that they would drop their enquiries elsewhere.” Consequently, following the Air Ministry’s 
suggestion, a Head of the RAF mission had to “be selected as quickly as possible and sent out 
to Nigeria to show our interest.”91 
Meanwhile in Lagos, the UK High Commissioner was trying “to knock some sense” 
into the Nigerian Defense Minister.92 Initially, it seemed as if Head was successful, because 
he brought Ribadu to ask London to send out an Air Commodore as designated head of a 
future mission to start planning, ahead of a general agreement on assistance.93 The problem 
was, however, that the Nigerian Defense Minister was not willing to make a choice among 
the candidates that the Air Ministry presented him for this post. In February 1962, he 
cancelled his trip to Britain, during which he was not only supposed to choose a British 
general to replace the outgoing General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Nigerian Army, 
but also the Head of the air force mission and someone for a similar position for the military 
academy. According to the Nigerian Prime Minister, because of Ribadu’s conflict with the 
current GOC, he would not move ahead on other issues before having replaced him.94 But 
matters turned out to be even more disappointing for the British. When the Minister of State 
for the Army came instead of Ribadu to London to interview the new potential GOC, he did 
not even want to meet the potential candidate to head the air force mission. Apparently, he 
was not allowed by his Defense Minister to deal with this issue before the conclusion of an 
air force assistance agreement.95 It was clear that despite all British insistence, Ribadu was 
not willing to move ahead before he had heard back from Canada, India, and Sweden.96 
In light of the Nigerian Defense Minister’s insistence to diversify his country’s 
sources of military assistance, in March 1962, the Joint Intelligence Committee concluded 
that it was “probable that British military influence may decline over the next years.”97 But at 
the same time, it seemed that Britain’s ‘competitors’ were either unable, or unwilling to help 
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the Nigerians building up their air force. First the Canadians, with whom the British were in 
close consultation, declined to assist the Nigerians in forming an air force. In light of 
Britain’s willingness to play this role, the Canadians did not seem to see the need to intervene 
at this level.98 Then, in briefing the Chiefs of Staff in mid-April, the UK High Commissioner 
in Lagos observed that “Sweden and India were not expected to help.” Head thus concluded 
that Britain would eventually be asked to build up the Nigerian Air Force.99 Back in Lagos, 
Head tried to push the Nigerian Defense Minister to finally take up the British air force 
assistance offer by emphasizing “that neither [the] Indians, Swedes nor Canadians would do 
it.”100 
In the Swedish case, the British High Commissioner was certainly right, because 
Stockholm was not willing to provide any governmental air force assistance. Only the 
Swedish aircraft manufacturer SAAB was eager to help the Nigerians on a commercial basis 
in order to sell aircraft.101 Yet the British seemed to have underestimated the Indians and, 
probably more importantly, the appeal it had for the Nigerians to get military assistance from 
a leading non-aligned state instead from Britain. In early summer 1962, an Indian Air Force 
team was invited to Nigeria to advise the Federal Government on air force matters.102 This 
was not yet a mission to build up a Nigerian Air Force, but a worried Commonwealth 
Secretary nevertheless enquired with Lagos whether this implied a “lack of confidence in us,” 
or if it came “from [a] desire to demonstrate their ‘non-alignment’.”103 Head reassured 
Sandys that the Nigerian Defense Minister favored India because he wanted to reduce 
Nigeria’s dependence on Britain, considered the Indians cheaper, and had been impressed 
during his visit to India by their training system.104 Inside the Air Ministry, however, the 
Nigerian preference for India was also seen as a “demonstration of non-alignment.”105 But the 
Nigerians had not yet taken a definitive decision on who was to build up their air force. The 
British, who were aware of the weaknesses of the Indian Air Force, thus put on a brave face. 
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They even reassured the Americans, and simultaneously probably themselves, that the 
Nigerians “would eventually turn back” to them.106 
This certainly was an all too optimistic assessment after what had happened since 
Nigerian independence. Admittedly, part of the explanation why the Nigerians hesitated to 
take up the British air force assistance offer was down to disagreements within the Federal 
Government and the potential cost of an air force. Yet by summer 1962, it had become not 
only obvious that the Nigerian Defense Minister was the man in charge, but also that he was 
desperately seeking an alternative to British military assistance, preferably from 
Commonwealth states. 
 
The Rival Within 
The British expected that the Nigerians would eventually turn to them for the establishment 
of their air force, because two ‘competitors’ – Canada and Sweden – had already dropped 
out, and it was expected that India would not be able to deliver. Moreover, they were 
confident that Nigeria would, despite its proclaimed foreign policy of non-alignment, not 
cross the Iron Curtain for military assistance. Meanwhile, London did not expect to be 
challenged from the major powers within the Western bloc, especially since Washington was 
still sticking to its mantra that military assistance to Nigeria was a British prerogative. But the 
British had failed to factor the West Germans, who had no such scruples, into the equation. 
The FRG stood in competition with the GDR in Africa, and it had already made inroads into 
Nigeria. With its military know how and colonialism in Africa long gone by, it thus became a 
serious alternative provider for air force assistance in the eyes of the Nigerian Government. 
The Germans were not new to Africa, but they had been largely absent from the 
continent since the loss of their colonies after the First World War. During the late 19th 
century ‘Scramble for Africa’, in 1884, the German Empire took officially possession first of 
German South West Africa, then of Togo and Cameroon and, finally, of German East Africa. 
Berlin’s imperial ‘adventure’ in Africa was, however, rather short-lived. Following the 
opening of hostilities in Europe, the First World War also rapidly spread to Africa, where the 
Germans lost Togo in 1914, South West Africa in 1915, Cameroon in 1916 and, finally, their 
colony in East Africa in 1917 – even though the commander of the German colonial forces 
there only surrendered after the armistice in Europe in November 1918. Eventually, article 
119 of the Versailles Treaty confirmed that Germany had to cede its colonies to the victorious 
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powers. Thereafter, there was no official German attempt to regain the lost colonies, and even 
in the Third Reich Sub-Saharan Africa remained on the margins of colonial and imperial 
thinking and planning.107 
Yet with the arrival of the Cold War in Africa in the wake of decolonization in the 
late 1950s, not one, but two Germanies returned to the African continent. After having been 
built up by their superpower patrons and fully integrated into the Western and the Eastern 
Bloc respectively, the FRG and the GDR disputed the international legitimacy to represent 
Germany. Therefore, in what turned into a German-German Cold War, Bonn and East Berlin 
fought for the diplomatic recognition by other countries. By the mid-1950s, the western and 
economically successful West Germany had a clear lead, and the GDR was only recognized 
by a handful of fellow Communist countries. The emergence of numerous new states in 
Africa thus represented for East Berlin an opportunity to gain diplomatic recognition, and 
thereby increase its international legitimacy and play its part in the escalating East-West 
struggle for the Third World. Consequently, with the first countries gaining independence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the East Germans rushed to the new African capitals to establish friendly 
and, preferably, diplomatic relations. In order to forestall such an outcome and in line with 
the Hallstein Doctrine,108 which implied that the FRG would not maintain or establish 
diplomatic relations with a state recognizing the GDR, Bonn dispatched its own diplomats to 
Africa. An early and significant episode of this competition came in the late 1950s with 
newly independent Guinea, where its leader, Sékou Touré, eventually opted for the wealthier 
West Germany, even though he would have preferred to avoid such a stark choice. This 
outcome became the norm in numerous similar scenarios. Nevertheless, Bonn had to fight a 
defensive battle in Africa, which did not only require the establishment of an extensive 
diplomatic network, but also the disbursement of important sums of development aid.109 
Meanwhile, in addition to fighting the German-German Cold War and, by extension, 
supporting the Western position in postcolonial Africa, Bonn also saw economic 
opportunities on the African continent, both for raw materials and exports. In order to woo 
African nationalist leaders in pursuing these political and commercial aims, the FRG 
                                                          
107 Winfried Speitkamp, Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005), pp. 155-156, 172; Dirk van 
Laak, Über alles in der Welt: Deutscher Imperialismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 
pp. 66-107. 
108 Named after senior German diplomat Walter Hallstein. 
109 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, passim. On the German-German rivalry in Africa, see also Engel and 
Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten; and Andreas Wilkens, “L’Allemagne et l’Afrique, 1949-1963,” in 
Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Gérard Bossuat, eds., L’Europe unie et l’Afrique: de l’idée d’Eurafrique à la 
convention de Lomé I: actes du Colloque international de Paris, 1 et 2 avril 2004, Groupe de liaison des 
historiens auprès des Communautés, Vol. 10 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2005), pp. 298-299. 
21 
 
presented itself not only as a champion of self-determination, but, in light of its distant 
colonial past in Africa, also as untarnished by colonialism.110 Against the background of the 
rise of the Third World, it would have been unwise and counterproductive for Bonn to try to 
capitalize on historical colonial links. This seemed especially true for the provision of 
military assistance to African states, where the absence of a recent colonial past proved to be 
a major asset for the FRG. In the early 1960s, the Federal Ministry of Defense developed an 
arms exports and military assistance program, which had been rendered possible by the 
creation of large weapons surpluses through rearmament, and the increased demand through 
African decolonization. Moreover, some newly independent African countries approached 
the FRG for military assistance. Bonn thus created a special fund for military assistance and, 
in June 1961, the Federal Defense Council authorized the Federal Ministry of Defense to 
decide – in consultation with the Foreign Office – independently on individual military 
assistance requests.111 Thereby, it was inevitable that the West Germans would tread on the 
toes of the former colonial powers in Africa, especially with people like the overzealous 
Brigadier General Herbert Becker on the ground.112 But in Africa, Bonn showed more respect 
for the traditional sphere of influence of its European integration partner France,113 than it did 
for Britain’s. 
Nigeria was of particular interest in Bonn’s eyes, not least because of its sheer 
population size.114 By autumn 1962, the West Germans had already developed friendly and 
increasingly close relations with Nigeria. The FRG was – after the United States and Britain – 
the third most important national donor of foreign aid,115 increasingly active at a cultural 
level, and Nigeria’s second most important trading partner.116 Moreover, it already had a foot 
in the Nigerian defense market. As early as October 1961, the Nigerian Defense Minister 
approached the German armaments manufacturer Rheinmetall for rifles and, potentially, help 
with the establishment of an ordnance factory in Nigeria.117 The British, who had offered the 
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Nigerian Government help with setting up such a factory, soon had to learn that the contract 
for this project was indeed going to Germany. Seemingly furious, the British High 
Commissioner in Lagos regarded this as “a frightful waste of money as it will mean 
jettisoning the [British] F.N. rifle and turning over to a German weapon.”118 In January 1962, 
at the same time as he tried “to knock some sense” into Ribadu in relation to the air force, he 
also tried to convince him to abandon the plan for a German ordnance factory. Eventually, his 
arguments that this was a waste of money that would disrupt the present equipment and 
training with British weapons were in vain.119 Instead, the ordnance factory was only the 
beginning of a growing West German-Nigerian defense relationship. In spring 1962, the 
Nigerian Defense Minister expressed his interest to visit the FRG. Brigadier General Becker 
argued that such a visit was in Germany’s interest, because Nigeria was the most populated 
African state, in which other countries were strongly interested, and it could be politically and 
economically beneficial. The German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauß, thus had the 
intention to invite Ribadu. Even though military assistance was not to figure officially on the 
agenda, the aim was to give the Nigerian Defense Minister a good impression of the 
Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) and the German armaments industry.120 
But while the West Germans grew closer to the Nigerians, the British focused on 
India. In November 1962, Whitehall learned that the Nigerian Defense Minister had 
eventually entrusted the Indians with the establishment of an air force, and that Delhi 
intended to take on this role. Nevertheless, Ribadu also asked London to assist by offering 
training “for advanced flying on more complicated planes and also the training of ground 
staff.” British policymakers were not, however, keen to play such a complementary and even 
junior role. The High Commissioner in Lagos advised against sending an RAF team to Lagos 
to assist the Indians, and to only consider the training of Nigerian pilots in the United 
Kingdom.121 This was echoed in the Air Ministry, which did not want an RAF team “to be 
placed in a subordinate capacity to an Indian team, as we would then either have to endorse 
their ideas or cause trouble by rocking their boat.” It was also feared that this could 
encourage the Nigerians to “play one off against the other in an endeavour to get cheaper 
aid.” Meanwhile, it was assumed that the Nigerians would not be ready for advanced flying 
training any time soon and that, if necessary, the Indians could provide it. Finally, it was 
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advised not to inject any British offers, because this could antagonize the Indians, and make 
“them more reluctant to seek our help later on should they subsequently get out of their 
depth.”122 Consequently, the British had come to accept that they had lost out on the air force 
assistance mission to Nigeria against a fellow Commonwealth, yet non-aligned country. 
Confronted with further setbacks in Lagos, the British High Commissioner was “sorry and 
disappointed that our negotiations and ability to influence the Nigerians in the field of 
Defence have been so unsuccessful.”123 
Yet there was a turn of events on the horizon that was even more disappointing for the 
British. Following the Sino-Indian War of late 1962, Delhi did not seem anymore interested 
or capable to assist the build-up of a Nigerian Air Force. But instead of London, the Nigerian 
Government turned to Bonn. According to the West German Embassy in Lagos, this was 
because German military and technological know-how was still held in high esteem in 
Nigeria. Even though it was considered in the West’s interest to do “everything” to maintain 
the still substantial Anglo-Nigerian defense relations, the embassy argued that the Nigerian 
efforts to diversify their sources of military assistance should be supported.124 The very same 
embassy questioned, however, whether Nigeria was aware of the potential political 
consequences, because West Germany was “in the line of fire of eastern propaganda,” and 
whether another western state was thus not better suited.125 It certainly was sensible to raise 
these questions, especially since Nigeria wanted to reduce its dependence on British military 
assistance to burnish its non-aligned credentials. Nevertheless, in early March 1963, the West 
German Government tested the waters with the British by informing them that they were 
thinking of sending military experts to Lagos to assess the Nigerian air force needs.126 
This was not well received in Whitehall. Within the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
it was questioned whether the pro-British Nigerian Prime Minister was aware of his Defense 
Minister’s approach to the Germans.127 But London’s attitude softened once it was realized 
that the German Foreign Office was trying to gain British approval, and had itself been taken 
off guard by the Federal Ministry of Defense’s rapid and independent sanctioning of the 
Nigerian request. British officials appreciated that the German Foreign Office seemed “at last 
to have woken up to the need to put the Federal Government house in order in regard to arms 
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supplies to cooperate with other Western powers concerned.” They were not amused by the 
increasingly extensive German military activities in Nigeria and Africa more generally. Yet 
they understood that the FRG was also receptive to Nigerian requests because it did not want 
to drive Lagos “to less desirable sources.” Consequently, there was a willingness in London 
to find an arrangement with the Germans in Nigeria.128 Moreover, the British High 
Commission in Lagos reported that Prime Minister Balewa was aware of the approach to the 
Germans, and in light of Ribadu’s determination to reduce Nigeria’s dependence on British 
military assistance, a diplomatic intervention would only be counterproductive. Ultimately, 
the Germans were considered “much preferable to some other possible choices.”129 
Nevertheless, the British remained hopeful that sooner or later Balewa, with the help of the 
influential Northern Premier, “might put Ribadu in his place.” In light of potential tensions 
within the Nigerian Government, Head also surmised that “the German authorities probably 
regretted being bounced into” this air force mission.130 
But Bonn was willing to take on this adventure, and on 19 April 1963, it signed an 
agreement with Lagos through which it committed the FRG to help with the build-up of the 
Nigerian Air Force. This included advice on all matters relevant for the training and 
equipment of the air force, the sending of an advisory group, the training of Nigerian 
personnel with the German Air Force, and support with the establishment of units and 
training establishments in Nigeria.131 The German Foreign Office was aware that the British 
were all but pleased with their country’s military activities in Nigeria and West Africa more 
generally, and insisted with the Federal Defense Ministry to bring its people there, notably 
Brigadier General Becker, under control.132 Meanwhile, the Americans were not only 
skeptical about the German air force mission to Nigeria, but also wanted the FRG to 
coordinate its military assistance to Africa with its Allies.133 Bonn was willing to do so, for as 
long as the information-sharing was based on reciprocity and did not endanger its commercial 
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interests.134 As a result, the FRG shared the details of the German-Nigerian air force 
assistance agreement with Britain, and refused to bow to Nigerian requests to avoid contact 
with the British in Nigeria.135 
Through the agreement with Nigeria, the FRG committed itself to the training of 
1,100 Nigerian Air Force personnel, and the supply of 56 aircraft.136 A military assistance 
program of such a scale could not long be kept secret and, as soon as the first German air 
force advisers were sighted on their arrival in Lagos in June 1963, it became public 
knowledge. The news about what was nothing less than the young Bundeswehr’s most 
significant foreign venture so far, immediately led to an outcry in Germany and further 
questions on Bonn’s military activities in the Third World. In order to calm domestic opinion, 
the Federal German Government emphasized the relatively modest cost of these programs, 
the coordination with allies, and that representatives of the Bundestag (Federal Diet) had been 
informed. Moreover, the Federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, justified it as a contribution 
to the political stability of newly independent states.137 Meanwhile, the Nigerian Defense 
Minister was fearful that the military cooperation with the FRG could provoke a backlash in 
Nigeria. The press associated with the NCNC, the junior partner in the NPC-dominated 
Federal Government, had already criticized the air force assistance on the basis of German 
NATO membership and militarism.138 Interestingly, however, domestic criticism remained 
relatively modest. Instead, even the NCNC’s mouthpiece, the West African Pilot, went so far 
as to justify German involvement by drawing a distinction between the FRG and Nazi 
Germany, and emphasizing the absence of German colonial aspirations.139 With a sense of 
relief, the German Embassy in Lagos observed that the general tenor of Nigerian newspapers 
was that “why should the Germans not do in Nigeria what the English, Canadians, Israelis 
and even Eastern Bloc representatives are allowed to do in other African states?”140 
This was a forceful demonstration that the Nigerian foreign policy of non-alignment, 
which led to the search for alternative sources of military assistance, was not anti-western, 
but anti-colonial. The air force assistance agreement with Germany came with more 
economic and political strings attached than what the British would have offered. Not only 
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was Lagos to carry the brunt of the cost, but it also implied that Nigeria sided with the FRG 
in the German-German Cold War. London, by contrast, would have offered some of the 
assistance for free, and even contributed to the training costs of Nigerian Air Force personnel 
in the United Kingdom.141 The crux of the issue was to reduce the dependency on British 
military assistance. Consequently, whereas in 1965 the British Army GOC was replaced by a 
Nigerian, the head of the German air force mission was to become the Commander of the 
Nigerian Air Force. Despite certain frictions, the Germans even stayed in Nigeria after the 
coups of 1966, and Bonn only withdrew its men in reaction to the outbreak of the Nigerian 
Civil War.142 The void was filled by the Czechoslovaks, who came in the wake of the 
Soviets, to whom the Federal Nigerian Government had turned after the American and initial 
British refusal to supply weapons to wage war on Biafra.143 The Nigerians thus only opted for 
Soviet Bloc military assistance when being cut off from Western supplies. Moreover, in 
reaction to this self-inflicted Communist incursion into the Nigerian defense market, London 
reversed its policy and delivered again weapons in support of the Federal cause.144 
 
Conclusion 
On the day of Nigerian independence, the future for Anglo-Nigerian defense relations looked 
bright. The two countries were about to enter into a defense agreement, which guaranteed 
Britain’s strategic interests and promised Nigeria substantial military assistance. Moreover, 
the Nigerian Armed Forces had not only been organized, trained, and equipped by Britain, 
but they were still led by British officers. London was thus confident that it would remain in 
charge of Nigerian defense. Yet already less than three years later, it was clear that something 
had gone wrong. The defense agreement had been rescinded, Lagos had turned to other 
countries than Britain for its equipment, notably to the FRG for an ordnance factory, and the 
responsibility for the build-up of Nigeria’s third armed service was in West German hands. 
When the Nigerians first came up with the idea of an air force, it was self-evident for 
Whitehall that this would be a mission for the RAF, especially since the potentiality of air 
force assistance was clearly written into the defense agreement. But in reaction to rising anti-
British, anti-colonial, African solidarity, and neutralist sentiments in Nigeria, as well as 
mounting criticism from other African, notably the ‘radical’ states, the Federal Government 
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embarked on a search for alternative sources of military assistance to demonstrate that it was 
living up to its proclaimed foreign policy of non-alignment. This search was, for the air force, 
at first confined to the Commonwealth and neutral Sweden. The British did not mind a 
supporting role by a Commonwealth country, especially not from Canada. Ottawa did not 
see, however, a need to get involved, for as long as London was willing to take care of the 
development of a Nigerian air force. Lagos thus opted for India, which as a leading non-
aligned country had a particular appeal for a government that wanted to burnish its non-
aligned credentials. But when it became clear that the Nigerian Defense Minister expected the 
British to play a junior role in an Indian-led air force development project, officials in 
Whitehall were not amused. Anyway, they still expected that one day the Nigerians would 
crawl back to them. 
But when the Indians withdrew their air force assistance offer in the wake of the Sino-
Indian War, instead of returning to the ‘mother country’, the Nigerians turned to the FRG. 
The West Germans not only already had a foot in the Nigerian defense market through the 
ordnance factory, but they were also important donors of development aid. Moreover, while 
the reputation of German military skills and know-how was still very much alive, the German 
colonial past was long behind. Consequently, it would have been counterproductive for Bonn, 
which was in search of African friends in the German-German Cold War and economic 
opportunities, to remind the Nigerians of their colonial past, especially in neighboring 
Cameroon. 
The German-Nigerian air force assistance agreement was a serious setback for the 
British, especially since they had hoped to use military assistance as a means to secure their 
strategic interests in Nigeria in the wake of the abrogation of the defense agreement in early 
1962. The challenge to Britain’s influence on Nigerian defense came not, however, from 
outside, but within the Western Bloc. The Nigerian leadership was clearly anti-communist 
and pro-western. Moreover, it wanted to maintain access to western know-how and, 
especially, money. Despite its proclaimed foreign policy of non-alignment, it was thus not 
willing to cross the Iron Curtain for military assistance. This did not mean, however, that 
Nigerian non-alignment was pure window dressing. In Nigeria, the British were challenged 
by a western variant of non-alignment, which was more driven by anti-colonialism than the 
Cold War. First and foremost, by diversifying the sources of military assistance, the 
Nigerians wanted to reduce their military dependency on, and alignment to Britain. Nigeria’s 
non-alignment was thus not a mere chimera, but comparable to the western neutrality of 
countries like Sweden and Switzerland. 
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The Nigerian Government was aware of the importance the choice of the source of 
military assistance represented for its credibility and that of its policies. In the early African 
Cold War market for military assistance, military equipment and training normally came, 
with a few notable exceptions, only from one bloc, and was the result of or led to a tacit 
alignment. But whereas the obvious source of military assistance for a western-oriented 
country tended to be the former colonial power or later increasingly the United States, other 
western suppliers, such as the FRG, provided an anti-colonial and seemingly less bipolar 
alternative. This was not too dissimilar to the Eastern Bloc, where Czechoslovakia emerged 
as the alternative to the Soviet Union. Consequently, in the early 1960s, the defense market 
added an additional layer of complexity to the Cold War in Africa. While this gave newly 
independent African states more than just an either-or choice, it also allowed non-colonial 
and lesser Cold War powers to play a role and gain influence on the African continent. In the 
case of Britain, this weakened its postcolonial security role in Nigeria. London first tried to 
meet the challenge with increasingly generous offers of military assistance, and then came to 
accept the German role in the development of Nigeria’s third armed service. This was still 
considered the much preferable option to Lagos turning eastwards. Whitehall was aware that 
for reasons of prestige and in reaction to the military build-up of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 
the Nigerians were adamant to strengthen their defenses. The question was thus not whether, 
but from where they would seek and, ultimately, receive military assistance. 
